Embodiment

Reminiscent of the concept of time in St. Augustine, our body is a part excluded from our conscience, at least until an unusual sensation, discomfort or pain call us to attention. This is because we do not “have” a body, rather we are one (Merleau-Ponty, 1945). Our self is not only a psychic abstraction nor a mere social construction: it is embodied (Hockey & Draper, 2005). Overcoming the traditional Cartesian dualism (Damasio, 1994), the concept of Embodiment refers to the phenomenological tradition in its study of the body and to modern neurocognitive discoveries concerning mirror neurons and the theory of mind. It states that many features of cognition are shaped by aspects of the entire body (Adams & Aizawa, 2009; Adams, 2010). Furthermore, the theory of the extended mind proposed by Clark and Chalmers (1998) focuses on the constitutive role of the physical environment in the formation of mental processes, too, while the theory of the embodied mind has been presented on a biological basis by the neurophenomenology of Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1991|2017). From this perspective, the embodied and phenomenological nature of the mind are studied starting from the identification of mirror neurons and the study of prelinguistic neurobiological processes (Jelić, 2015; Froese & Fuchs 2012).

Particularly regarding patient care relationships, the concept of embodiment bursts into clinical practice. The care of the other, especially in the health sector, is constituted by an encounter with the lived body of the other (Schubert & Semin, 2009). Such an encounter, as Waskul and van der Riet (2002) underline in their study on embodiment in palliative care, is often constituted as an encounter with a “grotesque body”, humiliated and humiliating, which no longer responds to the Self or which imposes itself on the conscience for the pain it causes. There are circumstances in which an unexpected corporeal mishap occurs (such as unintentional leaking of various hideous body fluids) when the body usurps into and threatens the definition of the Self (Waskul & van der Riet, 2002). Those who experience abject embodiment know that nobody (including themselves) can easily overlook the appearance of their unpleasant bodies and, consequently, of themselves.

Such complex dynamics from a psychological point of view destabilize patients’ sense of identity. A greater awareness of these dynamics concerning the body and embodiment could therefore guide the caring practice in better supporting patients. It is essential for the teams supporting dying patients to ensure that even in a situation in which the patient’s embodied Self is irreparably damaged, the sense of personal identity maintains its dignity. According to Testoni (2020), only to the extent that personal identity is maintained, in fact, is it possible for the person to attain wisdom, hence “the capacity generated by the relationship between what is it is learned in the experiences already lived and the signification of suffering, without this affecting the sapiential patrimony previously conquered” (Testoni, 2020, p.88)

Adams, F. (2010). Embodied cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 9(4), 619-628.

Adams, F., & Aizawa, K. (2009). “Why the mind is still in the head” in The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition, P. Robbins and M. Aydede (eds.), Cambridge University Press, pp.78–95.

Clark, A., & Chalmers, D. (1998). The extended mind. analysis, 58(1), 7-19.

Damasio, A. R. (1994).  Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain. New York: Putnam Publishing.

Froese, T., & Fuchs, T. (2012). The extended body: a case study in the neurophenomenology of social interaction. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 11(2), 205-235.

Hockey, J., & Draper, J. (2005). Beyond the womb and the tomb: Identity, (dis)embodiment and the life course. Body & Society, 11(2), 41-57.

Jelić, A. (2015). Designing “pre-reflective” architecture. Implications of neurophenomenology for architectural design and thinking. Ambiances. Environnement sensible, architecture et espace urbain, (1).

Merleau-Ponty, M. (1945). Phenomenology of perception. London: Routledge.

Schubert, T. W., & Semin, G. R. (2009). Embodiment as a unifying perspective for psychology. European Journal of Social Psychology, 39(7), 1135-1141.

Testoni, I. (2020). Psicologia palliativa: Intorno all’ultimo compito evolutivo. [Palliative Psychology: Around the last evolutionary task]. Torino: Bollati Boringhieri.

Varela, F. J. (1996). Neurophenomenology: A methodological remedy for the hard problem. Journal of consciousness studies, 3(4), 330-349.

Varela, F. J., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (1992 | 2017). The Embodied Mind, revised edition: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. MIT press.

Waskul, D. D., & Van der Riet, P. (2002). The abject embodiment of cancer patients: Dignity, selfhood, and the grotesque body. Symbolic Interaction, 25(4), 487-513.